

provides for notification of complainants by the Secretary of determinations made pursuant to their complaints.

§ 1977.4 Persons prohibited from discriminating.

Section 11(c) specifically states that “no person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee” because the employee has exercised rights under the Act. Section 3(4) of the Act defines “person” as “one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, business trusts, legal representatives, or any group of persons.” Consequently, the prohibitions of section 11(c) are not limited to actions taken by employers against their own employees. A person may be chargeable with discriminatory action against an employee of another person. Section 11(c) would extend to such entities as organizations representing employees for collective bargaining purposes, employment agencies, or any other person in a position to discriminate against an employee. See, *Meek v. United States*, 136 F. 2d 679 (6th Cir., 1943); *Bowe v. Judson C. Burns*, 137 F. 2d 37 (3rd Cir., 1943).

§ 1977.5 Persons protected by section 11(c).

(a) All employees are afforded the full protection of section 11(c). For purposes of the Act, an employee is defined as “an employee of an employer who is employed in a business of his employer which affects commerce.” The Act does not define the term “employ.” However, the broad remedial nature of this legislation demonstrates a clear congressional intent that the existence of an employment relationship, for purposes of section 11(c), is to be based upon economic realities rather than upon common law doctrines and concepts. See, *U.S. v. Silk*, 331 U.S. 704 (1947); *Rutherford Food Corporation v. McComb*, 331 U.S. 722 (1947).

(b) For purposes of section 11(c), even an applicant for employment could be considered an employee. See, *NLRB v. Lamar Creamery*, 246 F. 2d 8 (5th Cir., 1957). Further, because section 11(c) speaks in terms of any employee, it is also clear that the employee need not be an employee of the discriminator.

The principal consideration would be whether the person alleging discrimination was an “employee” at the time of engaging in protected activity.

(c) In view of the definitions of “employer” and “employee” contained in the Act, employees of a State or political subdivision thereof would not ordinarily be within the contemplated coverage of section 11(c).

§ 1977.6 Unprotected activities distinguished.

(a) Actions taken by an employer, or others, which adversely affect an employee may be predicated upon non-discriminatory grounds. The proscriptions of section 11(c) apply when the adverse action occurs because the employee has engaged in protected activities. An employee’s engagement in activities protected by the Act does not automatically render him immune from discharge or discipline for legitimate reasons, or from adverse action dictated by non-prohibited considerations. See, *NLRB v. Dixie Motor Coach Corp.*, 128 F. 2d 201 (5th Cir., 1942).

(b) At the same time, to establish a violation of section 11(c), the employee’s engagement in protected activity need not be the sole consideration behind discharge or other adverse action. If protected activity was a substantial reason for the action, or if the discharge or other adverse action would not have taken place “but for” engagement in protected activity, section 11(c) has been violated. See, *Mitchell v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.*, 278 F. 2d 562 (8th Cir., 1960); *Goldberg v. Bama Manufacturing*, 302 F. 2d 152 (5th Cir., 1962). Ultimately, the issue as to whether a discharge was because of protected activity will have to be determined on the basis of the facts in the particular case.

SPECIFIC PROTECTIONS

§ 1977.9 Complaints under or related to the Act.

(a) Discharge of, or discrimination against, an employee because the employee has filed “any complaint * * * under or related to this Act * * *” is prohibited by section 11(c). An example of a complaint made “under” the Act